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''Batty Mac''
Portrait of a Brigade Cornrnander of
the Great War, 1915-1917
Ian McCulloch
The Brigade has always been a source of pride and joy to me, and when sorrow came into
my life, and my only son was killed in action. it was the Brigade that saved me- pulled me
through and comforted me .... When we first mobilized at Mont de Cats, my job was to weld
four of the finest battalions Canada sent to the war into a real Brigade- a military Machine
that would run smoothly and well. Above all, I was anxious that the Brigade be a military
family. we would all love and be proud of. 1

Major-General A. C. "Batty Mac" Macdonell's
undelivered Farewell Address to 7th CIB, 9 June 1917.

S

ir Archibald Cameron Macdonell, KCB, CMG,
DSO, the first commander of 7th Canadian
Infantry Brigade [CIB] was unique, a throwback
to the Highland chieftains of yore, known politely
amongst his peers and the officer corps as
"Fighting Mac." The rank and file simply referred
to him as "Batty Mac." G .R. Stevens, who served
as a private in the Princess Patricia's Canadian
Light Infantry [PPCLI] and was eventually
commissioned in the regiment during the First
World War, remembered Macdonell's forward
style of command from the outset.
"Batty Mac, our brigade commander, was
crazy as a coot in many ways," he recalled. "I
saw him actually get wounded one day. He was
wearing ... square-pushing jodphurs ... bright
white .... Somebody said 'Be careful, sir, there's a
sniper' and he said 'Fuck the sniper,' climbed up
to get a look and the sniper took him through
the shoulder and he went ass over applecarts into
his shellhole from which he had emerged .... My
god, his language! You could hear him for miles
around!" 2 The furious Macdonell got out of the
shellhole and went back to retrieve his walking
stick, whereupon another bullet passed through
his left arm breaking the bone. Another officer
who witnessed the episode recorded that "there
is no doubt he would have been killed but for
the fact the German sniper was so excited
shooting at a General that he couldn't aim
straight!":3

Brigadier-General Macdonell was perhaps
one of the most eccentric, indomitable and
beloved officers to have commanded troops in
the First World War. Corporal Will Bird of the
42nd Battalion remembered his brigade
commander riding up to say farewell at Chateau
de la Haie: "Everyone had a good word for him
and stories of his decisions and actions were
legion." But when it came time for Macdonell to
speak, "the old fire-eater seemed overcome with
emotion ... put his horse to the gallop and left
without saying a word." 4 Stevens described him
in A City Goes to War, the Regimental history of
the 49th Battalion, as an officer of"a breed whose
passing has left this world a poorer place colourful, fearless, flamboyant in language, canny
in battle, unabashedly sentimental and emotional
over his men, who in turn regarded him with joy
and pride; they treasured his eccentricities, they
boasted (yes, and lied) concerning his highly
individual behaviour. "5
Macdonell started his military career by
attending Royal Military College [RMC] where he
excelled at games. At the end of his course at the
College, his report from the examiner in Civil
Engineering was, contrary to many academic
reports, an accurate prediction. It read: "A man
of marked ability who ought to rise rapidly in
his profession and be an acquisition to any staff,
on account of his high personal qualities. "6 On
29 June 1886, Macdonell graduated and was
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Above left: RMC Class of 1886- top. l. -r.: Kirkpatrick,
Worseley, Roe, Coutlee, Yorston, Macdonell.
Newcombe; middle: Maxwell. Henseley. Perry,
Sloggett, Kennedy, Carrington-Smith: front:
Cartwright, McColl, Newman, Girouard. ·

Above: Enlargement of Cadet Macdonell.
Left: Major A. C. Macdonell, Canadian Mounted Rjjies.
(Photos .from A.C. Macdonell Papers.
NAC Cl45101 & Cl45102)

back to the RNWMP but later transferred to Lord
Strathcona's Horse. He was the regiment's
commanding officer at the outset ofwar. 7

awarded a commission in the Royal Artillery of
the British Army. Due to financial difficulties in
his family, he was unable to accept. but at once
joined the Canadian Militia as a subaltern. Two
years later, on 6 April 1888, he became a
lieutenant in the Canadian Mounted Infantry of
the Permanent Force (PF). The following year,
however, saw him transfer into the Royal
Northwest Mounted Police (RNWMP) in which he
had a distinguished career for the next 18 years,
counting service time in South Africa.
Macdonell went to South Africa as a
squadron commander in Lord Strathcona's
Horse, winning a DSO and several mentions in
dispatches before being severely wounded and
subsequently evacuated back to Canada for a
lengthy convalescence. Eager to get back,
however, he was given command of the newlyformed 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles only to
arrive in Cape Town a few days after hostilities
had ceased. On return to Canada, Macdonell went

An intelligent and worldly-wise man,
Macdonell predicted in a letter dated 5 August
1914 to his nephew, Hugh Wallis, that "the war
is likely to be a long one and many contingents
\Villlikely go, at least so it looks to me, & I firmly
believe we shall win in the end, but Germany will
take a lot of beating indeed." Wallis would become
his uncle's Orderly Officer [00] in 7th CIB HQ in
December 1916, but not before joining the 16th
Battalion at Valcartier as a private, experiencing
Second Ypres and serving as a platoon
commander and scout officer with the 13th
Battalion, CEF, Royal Highlanders of Canada.
Macdonell's prescient letter to his nephew,
although unsuccessful in getting his headstrong
relative to wait before enlisting, offers some
interesting insights on his immediate prospects
as a Permanent Force [PF] cavalry officer:
They seem to be giving the cavalry the go bye
altogether and I may have to accept an infantry
command, a thing more or less incompatible to
me. However in wartime, the unfortunate
professional soldier must take what he is offered
one can't hang back. but I am much worried
over the prospect. Colonel Steele considers that
(as in the past) all plums will go to the eastern
wirepullers."

12
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Macdonell went to the UK with the First
Contingent, and later France, as the Commanding
Officer of Lord Strathcona's Horse. After a brief
stint as acting-commander of the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade, Macdonell's pocket diary
records on 17 December 1915: "Told officially I
am to command 7th Infantry Brigade. Gazette to
follow shortly." More interesting, however, are the
rough notes in the back of the same diary,
however, which give his outline credo on how
commanding officers are to command in his new
brigade. They read in part:
Orders -When you receive an order:
Say what am I wanted to do? When
am I intended to do it. then finish
your appreciation.
lst eliminate self
Get ambition to do the best for [all]..
Read your orders carefully and
say, Would I know what to do, etc.
Learn to check orders carefully with the map.
Points for COs Care of men.
think of them all the time
How can they be kept dry. fed & spared
work. etc. shld be second nature
Discipline Nothing without march
discipline [illegible] keeps their place.
Inspection of arms shld be 2nd nature
Duty of an officer ditto in Infantrymen's
feet.
HQs Men & Horses
In battle habit is everything
Position of an O.C.'s [sub] units ..
Make more use of horses and men mtd, etc they
will help
tremendously. CO should keep in close
touch with General.. .. officers
should never be glued to comd HQs
but try to anticipate events by being
forward. Get the habit of frequent
visits at regular intervals ... "

The brigade commander refers to "habit"
twice in his notes, stating that "in battle, habit is
everything." What does he mean? Macdonell, a
veteran soldier, knew that battle was a chaotic
affair and that in order to retain some semblance
of control in combat, "standard operating
procedures" would provide the troops with a
model of response to follow in times of extreme
stress. Also of interest is his personal emphasis
upon the importance of orders, his "directives"
or operational decisions through which he would
exercise command. He tells his COs he wants
them to stop and analyze their mission first, do

a time appreciation, then to formulate a plan to
execute it thoughtfully and intelligently. He also
stresses the administrative aspects of his
commanding officers' responsibilities towards
their troops and weapons in order to maintain
his brigade operationally effective.
Finally, he is concerned with the passage of
information and maintaining communications
with his battalions. A cavalryman himself, and
aware of the importance of timely intelligence and
constant contact, he reminds his COs that they
have horses. While he is not thinking of horses
being useful in trench warfare, he is considering
them no doubt as a means to speed up face-toface contact while out of the line or during
training. His command philosophy is clear in his
closing remarks. He wants his battalion
commanders to be well forward and constantly
visiting the men, anticipating their needs as well
as the enemy's intentions and pending events.
While some of the above may have sounded
like motherhood to the military man (two of his
four COs were fellow regular officers, one
Canadian, one British), Macdonell was
impressing his personal style of command on his
subordinates and setting in place his command
arrangements. He wanted to be perfectly clear
on how the command process was to work within
7th CIB so that his "military Machine would run
smoothly and well." And while the units he would
"weld" together were undoubtedly "four of the
finest battalions Canada had sent to the war",
only one was a veteran battalion while the other
three had no field experience whatsoever.
When the decision was made to form the 3rd
CID towards the end of December 1915, it was
decided that the new division should be formed
in France rather than in Canada or the UK. For
its senior ranking brigade, it absorbed the
Canadian Corps Troops Infantry Brigade (a twoday wonder) which was renamed 7th CIB on 22
December 1915. Macdonell's new command
comprised the RCR (commanded by LieutenantColonel. A.H. Macdonell, his cousin), the PPCLI
(Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Buller, DSO), the 42nd
Battalion, CEF, Royal Highlanders of Canada
(Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Cantlie) and the 49th
Battalion, CEF, Edmonton Regiment (LieutenantColonel W.A. Griesbach). Of the four battalions,
only the PPCLI were experienced veterans, having
come from a year's hard fighting and
13
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distinguished service with
the 80th Brigade in the 27th
British Division. The RCR. at
that time the only PF
battalion, had arrived in
France in November 1915
after 11 months garrison
duty in Bermuda and had
spent some time with 2nd
CIB doing work-up training
followed by a stint of work
parties. The two remaining
units, the 42nd and the 49th
had both arrived in France
one month earlier in October
1915, and had been placed
under the aegis of 1st CID for
trench warfare training. This
consisted of no more than
two 48 hour tours in the
front line and the same
period in reserve, followed by
two months of relentless
navvy work as unofficial
pioneer battalions. 10

one moment and cancelled
the next. We are in a
constant state of change and
jump. and so are they.
nothing runs smoothly and
none of the staff are sure of
themselves. Very unlike the
brigade they took us from
where every officer had been
a staff officer for years. I
should not be surprised if
they put us into the trenches
and forget to relieve us. 12

At that time, it was
obvious that the Princess
Patricias were the most
experienced trench fighters
in 7th CIB, let alone their
division. Yet, curiously, there
is no evidence whatsoever
that their Brigade and
Divisional commanders (or
their respective staffs)
recognised this fact by
insisting they share their
hard-won experience in
helping train their sister
battalions in the brigade or
division. The staffs were too
busy training themselves.
Instead, the other infantry
battalions would have to
learn by trial and error.

With the formation of 7th
CIB, however, incessant
labour behind the lines
would cease and four very
different infantry battalions
would find themselves
together for the duration of
Macdonell's forward
the war. When the PPCLI
joined 7th CIB, they were
presence, observation and
equipped with short Leesupervisory abilities during
Enfields and Vickers
this time are commented
machine guns, and, as the
Major-General A.C. Macdonell
upon repeatedly in his
former "was universally coveted ... all through the
subordinates' memoirs and letters. Lieutenant
Canadian Corps, wise men of the Regiment did
Royal Ewing of the 42nd wrote: "our Brigadier. ..
not leave their rifles lying about even in billets." 11
is a corker- quite an old boy, but very active. He
But the Regiment not only looked different
used to be up in the trenches at all hours of the
outwardly, internally, it was used to a different
day and night." 13 The 42nd War Diary (WD) was
command system - the standard operating
equally effusive: "During two months under the
procedures of its previous brigade. Major Agar
command of Brigadier-General Macdonell he had
Adamson, the battalion 2 il c was under no
made himself respected for his tireless activity
illusions that they had traded a comfortable, welland much beloved for his interest in all of us. "14
understood billet in a veteran, professional
Even the highly critical Major Adamson of the
brigade only to join an "amiture [sic] army." He
PPCLI was grudgingly forced to admit, though
wrote to his wife two weeks after joining 7th CIB:
somewhat pompously: "I am quite pleased with
our Brigadier, General MacDonald [sic]. He is
I think both the division and brigade staffs are
always on the job and seems to know his job,
doing their best but they have had no experience
and is most considerate .... He can be depended
and are in a shocking muddle. Orders are issued

14
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upon to use good judgement and not rush into
any sudden uncalled for move .... "15
Whether Brigadier-General Macdonell's near
fatal encounter with a German sniper illustrated
good judgement is a matter for debate, but as a
commander he was adamant that he would be
well forward in the defence maintaining direct
personal contact with his subordinates. This
meant that his staff had to cope in his absence
and there is some evidence that it struggled
initially prior to Mt Sorrel. The Brigade Major
(BM) does not appear to have been as dynamic
or keen as his commander on the "standing-up"
of the Brigade, for as Macdonell noted drily in
his diary on 23 December 1915: "Major Foster,
Royal Lanes, reported as Brigade Major and left
at once on leave."lfj Lieutenant Hugh Wallis gives
us a quick sketch of Foster's background when
he wrote to his mother on 6 January 1916: 'The
Brigade Major has now arrived and seems a very
decent and capable officer. He was at one time
on the staff of the Lieut. Governor of India and
was recently on the staff of one of Kitchener's
divisions. "17 Foster would be wounded before the
Mt Sorrel battle and temporarily replaced by
Captain Cecil Critchley, Staff Captain "1", who
would subsequently be wounded shortly after and
replaced by Captain Basil Wedd of Toronto from
HQ 3rd Division.
If Macdonell had no say in his choice of BM,
he certainly could handpick the rest of his staff,
a personal priority on learning he would
command an infantry brigade. Lieutenant Wallis
wrote home that "Uncle Archie has asked me to
go to his Brigade as Orderly Officer, or what it
amounts to, as A.D.C. to himself." Wallis' initial
perception of a brigade staff appointment was
that it meant "a bed to sleep in, comparative
safety, and many other advantages lucrative and
otherwise," though this first impression would
be rudely shattered as the year wore on. On 28
June 1916, the older and wiser 00 would write:
"The great objection I have to this place is that I
get very little sleep whether there is a show on or
not!" 18
Captain Critchley, Brigadier-General
Macdonell's PF adjutant from Lord Strathcona's
Horse, would come over to fill in as the Staff
Captain 'T'. That Critchley did not have any
experience of intelligence work or how an infantry
brigade operated was insignificant to Macdonell.

Critchley could learn on the job. Macdonell's
attitude was one that prevailed throughout the
BEF with regard to professional intelligence
work. "It was continually held [pre-1914] that
the best man to help a commander assess the
capabilities of enemy infantry was an infantryman
and the best man to judge the potential threat of
cavalry was a cavalryman," wrote the British
Intelligence Corps historian. For an officer to
devote his career to Intelligence was "in most
Generals' opinion, a short-sighted policy which
would lead to an officer having a specialized and
narrow outlook to problems which required a
wide and practical background of military
experience." 19
Lieutenant Wallis, as a former infantry
battalion Scout Officer, became an indispensable
assistant to Capt Critchley. "I am going to attach
myself to Capt [Tom] Rush on the 'Q' side of the
staff for the next few weeks as far as possible,"
Wallis wrote home, but the arrangement was only
allowed by Critchley on the condition that Wallis
"still take a hand in the T side, paying particular
attention to Sniping, Observation and Maps. "20
Capt Rush was another Strathcona import,
having served as Macdonell's regimental QM
prior to his staff job. Critchley would be
promoted Major after Sanctuary Wood and would
act as BM at the Somme battles when Wedd went
out with pneumonia. 21
Numerous references in Macdonell's diary
indicate his preoccupation with finding a good
Brigade Machine Gun Officer (BGMO), visiting
no less a personage than Brigadier-General
Harington at Corps to discuss the matter.
Eventually his cousin "Archie Angus" Macdonell
commanding the RCR supplied him with the
indomitable Captain H.T. Cock, (known in that
Regiment during and after the war as "Hairy
Tremendous"), the PF officer who had authored
the CEF manual on the Colt HMG while serving
in Bermuda. Lieutenant George Macdonald,
PPCLI, whom Macdonell claimed as one of his
own clan and affectionately called "Seorus
Agraidh" (Red George) in all correspondence,
became the Brigade Grenade Officer (BGO), and
later replaced Critchley as Staff Capt "I" when
the latter was promoted and became BM. 22
One area in which Macdonell had no initial
say was in his battalion commanders. "Archie
Angus," his cousin commanding the RCR, he
15
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knew intimately. Griesbach, a former CMR
trooper in South Africa, was a cavalry officer
acquaintance, as well as the son of a former
RNWMP colleague. Lieutenant-Colonel Cantlie of
the 42nd and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller of the
49th were respectable officers and gentlemen, but
both were unknown factors.
Griesbach was a man after Macdonell's own
heart. Six days after the latter's return to HQ 7th
CIB from sick leave in the Spring, the Brigadier
wrote to the CO of the Edmontonians and, in no
uncertain terms, assessed his abilities.
"A Good Commanding Officer makes a Good
Regiment." Many have not the personality
necessary at all to command men [underlining
by Macdonell]. You have and I congratulate you
on it. I should like to congratulate you also in
the straight and fearless way in which you have
reported on the Ross rifle. If only all COs would
write or speak out as straight (not only about
the rifle; also about all things concerning their
commands) smooth working and officering
would be largely increased. 2 "

Arriving back from his convalescence in
hospital, Brigadier-General Macdonell must have
also taken stock of the new CO of the RCR who
had replaced his cousin in April when the latter
left to take command of the 5th CIB. LieutenantColonel Claude Hill, a PF officer of 15 years
service prior to the War, came to the brigade with
18 months experience as Battalion 2 il c of the
24th Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Canada (VRC),
in 2nd Division. It was Hill who would earn the
nickname "The Shino Boys" for the RCR the day
after he took command when it came out of the
line in the Salient on 21 April. The regiment was
greeted with the new CO's orders "that all kit
must be cleaned and all buttons kept shined
when the unit was in billets behind the front line.
Some grumbling resulted; but the Permanent
Force officers, with a strong belief in the efficacy
of smartness in enhancing morale, welcomed the
orders and supported the Commanding Officer's
stand with a firmness that soon ended all
opposition. "24
Whenever Macdonell visited the battalions or
higher HQs, he always took a staff officer with
him, usually his nephew Hugh Wallis, and later
in his tenure, his other nephew, Harold. Hugh's
brother, Captain Harold Wallis of the 16th
Battalion, came to 7th CIB in October to replace
his brother as 00. Hugh Wallis had moved up to

Staff Captain "I" in September replacing George
Macdonald who was wounded at the Somme. The
flexibility of brigade staff officers is shown when
he wrote his mother: "Capt [P.E.] Coleman has
been away on leave so I have been looking after
A&Q while Harold has been on 'T' for me. I am
OC Rear HQ consisting of the interpreter and
myself; [the paymaster] is on leave and the
veterinary officer at division, so I have my hands
full." Two weeks later he wrote "this short tour
in charge of A&Q of the Brigade has given me a
great chance to learn things which I have not had
an opportunity of doing before. "25
That Macdonell allowed his fledgling staff
some latitude within the scope of their
responsibilities is evidenced by remarks made
by Wallis during the temporary command of 7th
CIB by F.O.W. Loomis (14 March-5 May), standing
in for Macdonell while he recovered from his
wounds. After serving only 12 days under the
newly-promoted Brigadier-General Loomis,
Lieutenant Wallis was writing home: "I hope Uncle
Archie will be back soon; otherwise I shall
resign; ... F.O.W.L. my old battalion O.C. is in
command here now." Three weeks later. he was
more emphatic about Macdonell's return:
Nothing will please me so much as Uncle Archie's
return; everyone is just sort of standing by until
he comes back. I don't seem able to do a thing
under the present regime although the G.O.C.
is very decent to me, everyone has difficulty
carrying on because of his perpetual interfering
and directing. I often feel like asking to go back
to the regiment, but must wait and have all the
information I can, to give to Uncle Archie. 26

The Loomis "regime" serves to highlight
Macdonell's personal command style and
philosophy. Loomis' apparent over-supervision
trampled the trust and confidence that had been
slowly building up within the HQ staff as they
learned their trade, and it is not apparent from
unit war dairies, regimental histories or letters
that the stand-in brigadier ever visited the
forward battalions, thus making his presence felt
to the troops under his command. Hearing of
his HQ's malaise via various visitors to his
convalescent hospital, Macdonell reappeared on
6 May 1916, before his wounds had truly healed,
the doughty warrior convinced his clansmen
needed him. A relapse in the third week sent him
back for several days, causing Lieutenant -Colonel
Buller. PPCLI, the senior CO, to move across as

16
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acting-brigade commander, but at least Loomis
had moved on to 1st Division.

claim little better than a draw, for the original
front was established in most of the sector. 29

The three major engagements of the Canadian
Corps in 1916- the St. Eloi Craters fiasco, Mount
Sorrel and the Somme battles - reflected the
inexperience and the continuing amateur nature
of the organization. "Deft coordination of all the
components of the Corps, careful preparation
prior to battle and skilled use of artillery
resources that would characterize the Canadian
performance in 1917 and 1918 were absent,"
notes William F. StewartY Some progress had
been made towards a more professional and
efficient force, but too many officers and men still
had to learn their jobs. Not only was the staff of
7th CIB raw, its parent formation, 3rd Division
had only been "stood up" in the winter of 191516 and declared operationally ready as a division
in March 1916. Even more woefully unprepared
was the 4th Division which would land in France
in mid-August 1916, forego the careful
acclimatization process and contact training
previously enjoyed by the other three Canadian
divisions, and be committed to battle the
following month. Of the three "shows" of 1916,
7th CIB would find itself deeply involved in the
latter two actions, the first one defensive, the
second, offensive.

For Brigadier-General Macdonell and 7th
CIB, Mount Sorrel would be their first defensive
battle as a brigade. "The June Show", as it came
to be called, occurred at the apex of the Ypres
Salient, a comparatively flat piece of terrain,
dominated in the south-easterly portion by a low
wooded hill known as Mount Sorrel. Practically
all the ground held by 3rd Division in the forward
area was still wooded at this stage in the war, its
frontage of2,500 yards running from the Menin
Road in the north, south to Mount Sorrel
inclusive. As a control measure, this in turn was
divided into two brigade frontages of which 7th
CIB had responsibility for the left and the 8th
CIB the right on the day of battle. Each brigade
defensive scheme called for two battalions in the
front line, one in support and one in brigade
reserve. The 7th CIB's two front line battalion
sub-sectors were known as the Hooge sector on
the left, the line running through the ruins of the
village of that name, and the Sanctuary Wood
sector on the right. Both of these sectors were
dominated by Mount Sorrel and two other hills
to their south in the 8th CIB sector. Thus the
PPCLI History notes: "It was early recognized that
if the Germans made a determined attempt to
reach Mount Sorrel, this front line would be
quickly blown out of existence. The defence
scheme for Sanctuary Wood and Hooge was
therefore dependent upon resistance which might
be provided by the second or R-line.'':Jo

The defensive battle, Mount Sorrel,
"constituted only a small, localized operation of
little or no significance to the outcome of the war"
according to historian D.J. Goodspeed, " ... in
comparison with the monstrous battles of
Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele ... "28 In
the operational scheme of things, it was a German
spoiling attack against the 3rd Canadian Division
in the hopes of tying down Allied forces and
preventing their transfer to Picardy for the
pending Somme offensive. It can essentially be
viewed as a fight of three rounds: the Germans
winning the first two, but the Canadians winning
the all-important third. Its three phases consisted
of: the initial German attack on 2 June and the
uncoordinated, overly hasty and abortive
Canadian counterattacks on 3 June; the second
German attack on the afternoon of 6 June; and,
the successful, deliberate Canadian
counterattack launched in the early morning of
13 June by the veteran 1st Division, which forced
the Germans to relinquish most of their gains.
The strategic aim of the German operation was
not achieved and tactically the Germans could

On the morning of 2 June 1916, German
artillery fire on the 3rd Division's area developed
into the heaviest bombardment endured by
British troops up to that stage in the war.
Trenches and their garrisons holding them
vanished in clouds of dirt and dust, while whole
trees in Sanctuary Wood were hurled skyward
by the bursting shells. After exploding four large
mines slightly forward of Mount Sorrel, the
German infantry overwhelmed the 8th CIB front
line trenches and captured the important high
ground as well as Hills 61 and 62 by nightfall.
The PPCLI, as right forward battalion in the
Sanctuary Wood sector, was on the northern flank
of the main German assault. Its right forward
rifle company was virtually annihilated at the
outset by artillery fire but its left forward
company shifted left to help the survivors and
17
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Major-General A.C. Macdonell (seated)
looking out over the Germanfront line.
February 1918.

Battalion the next day- took place
largely on 8th CIB territory.

together they grimly fought back. Nicholson's
Official History rightly states: "Credit for
temporarily checking the enemy's right wing
belongs to the [forward] Patricias .... As the
Germans surged eastwards, its rifles volleyed into
the enemy's right rear. [They were] to hold out
successfully for eighteen hours, isolated from the
rest of the battalions and with all their officers
killed or wounded. ":11 The PPCLI CO was killed
leading the remnants of his two other rifle
companies in repeated counterattacks up and
down the support and communication trenches
of 8th CIB during the afternoon, buying valuable
time for the RCR support companies and two
42nd Battalion rifle companies trying to shore
up the R-line 500 yards to the rear of the PPCLI.
Two other 42nd rifle companies were sent over
the brigade boundary into Maple Copse at the
rear of 8th CIB's collapsed front line in order to
prevent the brigade being flanked from that
direction.
In essence, the first German success at Mount
Sorrel had obliterated all brigade boundaries,
and the most desperate and important fighting
of 7th CIB- the defence of Warrington Avenue
and Lover's Walk by the PPCLI on the afternoon
of 2 June, and the counterattack of the 49th

The RCR, the left forward battalion
in the Hooge sector had minimal
activity on its frontage but soon had
to turn its right flank towards the
enemy once the survivors of the
PPCLI front line companies withdrew
to the R-Line. Brigadier-General
Macdonell liaised with the British
formation on his left flank and
arranged for British troops to take
over the RCR's responsibilities
beyond Hooge so they in turn could
shift right. HQ 3rd Division was
fighting its first defensive battle
without the benefit of a commander.
Major-General M.S. Mercer had been
killed by German artillery while on
reconnaissance in the 8th CIB sector, and the
latter formation's commander wounded and
captured.
Once HQ 3rd Division had confirmed that
the 8th CIB frontage had been captured, it
ordered 7th CIB at 1730 hours, 2 June, to restore
the situation, giving Brigadier -General Macdonell,
two battalions from its reserve brigade. 9th CIB.
Corps intervention later revised the initial plan
and set the time for a coordinated divisional
counterattack, reinforced by lst Division units.
for 0200 hours the following day. An immediate
counterattack by 7th CIB, however, was virtually
impossible, whoever was ordering it. The
brigade's reserve battalion, the 49th, which had
stood to since 1000 hours, 2 June. was far to
the rear in Ypres and had to come forward
through smashed-in trenches and an unceasing
hail of HE, shrapnel and tear gas shells, as did
the two 9th CIB battalions which were still further
to the rear. :12
Brigadier-General Macdonell ordered the
49th CO to physically coordinate and command
the attack on the ground forward, but due to
darkness, confusion wrought by the heavy
bombardment and lack of communications. the
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0200 hours "Zero Hour" for the attack was
repeatedly delayed until 0700 hours the following
day. The 7th CIB attack did not go in with the
others on their right flank as two 9th CIB
battalions failed to show up at the assembly area
on time. Finally, an exasperated LieutenantColonel Griesbach ordered the only battalion in
position, his beloved 49th, to attack alone in
broad daylight at approximately 0900 hours.
With virtually no artillery preparation, the
Edmontonians suffered 358 casualties in the
space of a few short minutes, achieving nothing. 3 :1
The 42nd History described it as a "forlorn hope,"
as no other supporting attacks on the right from
1st Division accompanied it. thus allowing the
Germans to concentrate maximum firepower on
the lone battalion advancing in the open.:l 4 The
49th's losses on 3 June were only surpassed by
the veteran PPCLI battalion who had suffered
over 400 casualties, though these were sustained
over a 24-hour period rather than in a mere 20
minute timespan.
With two battalions severely mauled, a CO
killed and a failed counterattack to its credit, the
battered 7th CIB was finally relieved on 5 June
1916. Less than two and half months later they
would be sufficiently rested and reorganised,
given some basic assault training, and sent to
take their turn in the "meat grinder" battles
further south, known collectively as the Somme.
During the first of the two major operations
of 1916, the battle of Mount Sorrel, the picture
that emerges of Macdonell is of a cool, calm,
collected commander, working behind the scenes
to ensure a coordinated effort and trying make
sure his troops were in the right place at the right
time with the right resources. In occupying the
northern half of the Salient he had always been
concerned about the high ground on his right
flank to the south where even the most limited
penetration could bring the enemy into his right
forward battalion's rear. However, through his
foresight and planning he had sought permission
from 8th CIB when they had occupied their sector
prior to the battle, to position No.3 Company
PPCLI in that brigade's rear area in case of such
an eventuality. He and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller
had readily appreciated that if the enemy were
to gain Warrington Avenue, a communications
trench which angled back from the 1st CMR's
front to his reserve line, his entire brigade
position would be compromised. 35

In essence, his brigade "vital ground"
(ground, which if lost, renders the commander's
position untenable) was in another brigade's area
of responsibility. By wisely anticipating the
enemy's possible actions through a worst
possible scenario approach, Macdonell ensured
before the battle ever began that he had balance
- a better chance of defending his sector than if
he had slavishly adhered to brigade boundary
lines on a map. One could readily agree with a
brigadier commenting in 1917 that "the battle
'command' is today subordinated to the battle
'preparation.' Our fights are won or lost before
we go into them. "36 Though Victor Odium was
referring to the set-piece assault, his comments
certainly have some validity for the British trench
defences of 1916, especially those in the Ypres
Salient where the enemy was consistently blessed
with the initiative and dominating ground. How
the defensive battle was to be fought had to be
well thought out beforehand and discussed and
rehearsed from the battalion level of command
right down to the platoon. Each battalion
commander was responsible for having his own
battalion defensive scheme.
During the 2-3 June battle, command and
control at the brigade level of front line troops
was, for all intents and purposes, completely lost
as all communications were cut by shellfire
except for the RCR on the extreme left.
Lieutenant-Colonel Griesbach wrote after the
battle that he "could not conceive how higher
command can influence the defence of positions
without some better means of communication
than now exist. As it stands, an attack might
engulfthe whole of the frontline troops, and the
fugitives' arrival at the Brigade HQ might be the
first intimation of the fact. ":37 But as most enemy
assaults were accompanied by a massive barrage,
defenders usually had more than adequate
warning.
When it was obvious the German artillery
barrage of 2 June was abnormally heavy and not
abating, Brigadier-General Macdonell had
ordered the 49th to "stand-to" at 1000 hours and
be ready to go forward. He did not need orders
from higher command to understand the
essentials of his mission. It was a standing order
to hold the front line at all costs, a task which
his veteran Patricias, bearing the brunt of the
attack that day, knew only too well. The
regiment's steadfast performance and delaying
19
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actions gave Macdonell the requisite time to
shift his forces to consolidate the R-line and to
move additional troops to the rear of 8th CIB.
Forward of the R-line, the battle became very
much a company and battalion commanders'
"show," local initiatives and common sense
dictating the defence.

Urquhart, after the war, acknowledged that the
officers and men under Macdonell's command,
"could only be attacked through him, which is
alright up to a point, but which has its
disadvantages. In short, I would say that with
General Mac it was a religion to stand up for his
subordinates on every occasion. "~l

The only failure in Macdonell's conduct of
the brigade defensive battle could be said to have
been the abortive counterattack of the 49th. Once
the orders were issued for this attack, Macdonell
had no control over the proceedings, having
delegated authority for its ultimate conduct and
launching to Lieutenant-Colonel Griesbach, his
designated commander on the ground. However,
like a true commander, he recognized that
delegation of the task did not necessarily absolve
him of the responsibility for its failure and that
he must ultimately share some of the guilt as he
had delegated a task to a subordinate without
fully ensuring that subordinate had the requisite
resources or time to accomplish the task, in this
instance- adequate artillery fire support and the
additional manpower of two 9th CIB battalions
placed under his command for the operation.
After the battle. Macdonell shielded LieutenantColonel Griesbach's actions in ordering his sole
counterattack battalion forward in the doomed
assault (a decision which must have taken a great
deal of soul-searching on Griesbach's part, as it
was his own command) and took full blame for
all mistakes upon himself in his official report
to higher HQ stating:

In retrospect, Brigadier-General Macdonell
could have told higher HQs before his brigade
counterattack went in, that their timing for an
immediate counterattack had long since passed
and that he had not been allocated nearly enough
time for what was really the mounting of a
deliberate counterattack. Currie commanding lst
Division certainly did, but it did not help. When
the Corps order was issued at 2045 hours in the
evening of 2 June several factors dictated that
the latter form of assault was the type actually
required: the Germans had already been
consolidating their gains around Mount Sorrel
for some six hours; the troops who would have
to be used for the counterattack were several
miles from their projected forming-up places and
would have no time for reconnaissance; artillery
fire plans would have to be prepared without
accurate information on the new enemy positions;
and nothing had been done to silence or
neutralize the enemy artillery which was still in
great preponderance around the Salient.

In reviewing the work done by the 7th Brigade.
perhaps the proudest thing I can say is 'the
machine worked smoothly and well." It follows
that the mistakes- and what military operation
takes place without them?- were my own. Let
the splendidly gallant officers and men who
carried out my orders faithfully unto death and
held the single line trench at that time was our
only bulwark against defeat, receive their
measure of earned praise full to overflowing. "8

This propensity of Macdonell for downwards
loyalty secured for him the love and respect of
his subordinates. One battalion commander told
Macdonell's biographer, A.E. Kennedy-Carefoot,
that "in his early army history when he was "on
the mat" before his superiors, Macdonell [had]
stood by him splendidly. Such loyalty to one of
his subordinates was unforgettably appreciated
by the hapless victim." Griesbach, in an interview
with Sir Arthur Currie's biographer, Hugh

9

In short, every basic principle for ensuring a
successful deliberate counterattack would be
ignored under the pretence that an immediate
counterattack was being mounted and these
oversights could therefore be excused.
Goodspeed notes that "in light of all this it is
difficult not to regard Byng's order as an
emotional rather than a rational reaction.
Whatever the reasons for the order were. it was,
as always, the troops who had to pay for the
mistake. In the event, and not surprisingly,
almost everything that could go wrong did go
wrong." 40
Whether Macdonell actually believed the
ordered counterattack could succeed is not
recorded, but at least the PPCLI and 49th
Battalion Histories note his more immediate
concern as being the PPCLI's precarious state,
verging on breakdown. "Not to attack," recorded
the 49th History, "meant leaving the Patricias to
their fate." The death of the PPCLI's CO, the
serious wounding of their 2 i/c, and heavy
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casualties among the senior officers and senior
NCOs, had left command and control in the
hands of a few junior officers and NCOs, most of
whom were also wounded. The PPCLI History
confirms in a rather convoluted fashion that "the
Patricias in the line had borne the strain of
twenty-four hours of constant bombardment and
fighting superbly; but though they were still
'perfectly cheerful' they were becoming physically
and nervously exhausted. "41
Because Macdonell stood by him, Griesbach
survived, and his vindication as a good CO was
reflected in his solid performance in future battles
and subsequent promotion to Brigadier the
following year. Griesbach knew whom to thank,
telling Macdonell in a farewell letter that "Your
treatment of those under you has had a result
which you may not have foreseen - your
Commanders have always been free men- free
to serve you without fear of anything
underhanded. Proud to have your commendation
and too proud to merit your censure." Another
letter after the war, (Griesbach having served yet
a second time under Macdonell in 1st Division).
would be even more frank, stating: "To you I owe
more than I can say. Friendly and constructive
criticism, sound advice, generous encouragement
and appreciation - all these and more I have
received at your hands. I have not only had justice
from you but also mercy, and at times, was more
in need of mercy thanjustice." 42

The 3rd Division, containing 7th CIB, was to
be employed both in September and October on
the narrow front bounded on the north by the
winding Ancre River and on the south by the
line of the Albert-Bapaume road which bisected
the town of Courcelette. As the left forward
division of the Canadian Corps, 3rd Division had
the role of facing Ancre Heights to the north and
securing a defensive left flank to the general
Corps attack being pressed forward astride the
Albert-Bapaume road. On 15 September, the
Canadian Corps was ordered to attack on a two
division frontage, 3rd Division left forward with
one brigade up (8th CIB) to provide flank
protection, and 2nd Division right forward to
attack the forward defences in front of
Courcelette. The 7th CIB was called up to exploit
the success of 2nd Division in front of Courcelette
pushing in between 8th CIB on its left and 5th
CIB on its right. The 7th CIB secured the Fabeck
Graben Trench with the 42nd Battalion and the
PPCLI with minimal trouble and casualties
thereby securing 5th CIB's left flank as it
captured Courcelette with relative ease. 44

After Mount Sorrel, the Canadian Corps
moved to the Somme, that archetypical First
World War battle which saw long linear waves of
heavily burdened infantrymen plodding forward
shoulder to shoulder as Maxims mowed them
down. It was already a killing ground when the
Canadians arrived in September, while Macdonell
was trying to cope with a deep dark depression
brought on by the news of the death of his only
son, Ian, a pilot with the Royal Flying Corps.
Distraught and distracted, he felt he could not
devote his full and proper attention to the pending
attack. According to his biographer, he went to
HQ 3rd Division and had a personal interview
with Major-General Louis Lipsett. "He asked to
be excused from the attack." Lipsett expressed
sympathy but told him it was out of the question
and that he must command the attack. 43
Brigadier-General A.C. Macdonell and his son,
Lieutenant Ian Macdonell, Royal Flying Corps. Ian
was shot down and killed over German lines during
the Battle of the Somme. July 1916.
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The 7th CIB's luck ran out the very next
day, however, as German defenders rallied and
stiffened their defences with a fresh brigade of
battle-hardened Marines. The RCR and 42nd
battalions going forward early the next morning
with little artillery preparation, hoped to exploit
to the next line of trenches, but suffered heavy
casualties as a result of their unimaginative effort.
Taken out of the line to refit. 7th CIB would be
committed to battle the following month in 3rd
Division's continuing futile attempts to take the
infamous Regina trench. This time, the 49th
Battalion and the still weakened RCR would
make disastrous unsupported frontal attacks,
and although the RCR would break into the
trench system, it would be repulsed by repeated
counterattacks and sustain over 70 per cent
casualties.
The attacks that 7th CIB were called upon
to mount at the Somme have been termed
"deliberate" though in fact they were poorly
coordinated "hasty" attacks. Major-General
Lipsett himself recognised that Macdonell's men's
achievements on the 15 September 1916 were
essentially the combination of good luck and good
reconnaissance work. He wrote afterwards:
The problem which faced the commander of the
7th Brigade was a hard one. Four and a half
hours only were available to march five miles
over difficult country devoid of landmarks,
through enemy barrages, to deploy for attack in
broad daylight in a captured and partially
obliterated German trench, the whereabouts of
which was not known, except from the map. to
the battalion commanders, and to launch the
attack. on a two-battalion front at 6 P.M.
Nevertheless. owing to the previous excellent
reconnaissance work of the regimental scout
officers and scouts who had been sent ahead.
and who met their battalions en route, all
battalions were in their places on time, and the
attack went forward punctually.'15

That luck played a part in the afternoon's
proceedings is underlined by the following
revelation in the 42nd's Regimental History: "No
detailed Battalion operation order was issued
owing to lack of time and so hurriedly was the
whole undertaking carried out that it is doubtful
whether anyone, except the officers and a few of
the NCOs, had any definite understanding ofthe
exact task and even these necessarily had but
slender knowledge of it. "46 The Brigade was
thus launched and Macdonell's command and

control capabilities with regards to the
attacking battalions thus ended. The onus fell
upon the battalion commanders to carry the
attack forward.
Macdonell still retained command and
control of his support and reserve battalions
however, units which he could feed into the battle
as he saw fit and thus still influence the outcome.
He also controlled the reserve elements of the
Brigade MG Coy and TM Battery. The battalion
commanders, to a degree as well, became
impotent as their assault companies went
forward from their designated jumping off lines.
The CO usually stayed back with the reserve
company and HMGs or in a nearby dugout. The
Battalion commander's role in battle was to act
as a sort of advanced report centre for his
forward companies to report back to so
information could be relayed back to the
Brigadier or laterally to flanking units. He too
could manoeuvre his reserve and HMGs, request
reinforcements or artillery support, liaise
laterally with flanking units, or order withdrawals
or realignments as required.
Despite 7th CIB's problems on the Somme
(most not of its own making), the second year of
the brigade's existence under Macdonell was one
marked by a higher level of competence and
professionalism, higher standards of training,
reorganization of its fighting components at the
brigade, battalion, company and platoon levels
and the development of a distinctly Canadian
attack doctrine. New applications of technology
and tactics included the massive HMG barrages
and interdiction introduced on a grand scale at
Vimy, counter bombardment and sound-ranging
techniques, counter-electronic warfare, the
introduction of new gases, aerial photography,
increased use of wireless, the wide spread use of
the grid communications system. and fire and
movement at the platoon and company level. In
the course of the year, 7th CIB would participate
in two major operations, Vimy and
Passchendaele, and a brigade-sized raid
conducted at Avion in June 1917. After Vimy,
Macdonell would be earmarked for higher
command.
The story of the Canadian Corps' 9-12 April
assaults on Vimy Ridge is perhaps the most welldocumented in Canadian military history and will
not be explored in any great detail in this article
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Top: ''The Shino Boys .. : Non-commissioned officers
o.f the Royal Canadian Regiment.

(NAC PA 3238)

Above: Vimy Ridge. 191 7. Looking out over the Douai
Plain and coa{[ields.

(DHHJ

Right: Jocks o.f the 42nd Battalion. Royal
Highlanders o.f Canada .from Montreal in a .fairly
pristine-looking trench.
(DHHJ

other than to outline those salient points required
to provide some historical context for the
operations of 7th CIB before, during and after
this seminal battle. Lieutenant-General Byng's
plan called for a frontal attack by all four divisions
of the Corps in numerical order from the right to
left. The 3rd Division, facing La Folie Wood, was
ordered to attack on a two brigade front. The 8th
CIB would be on the right and the 7th CIB on
the left the latter brigade advancing in the
shadow of Hill 145. 47 In 7th CIB, three battalions
would take part in the assault, each advancing
with two companies up and two in support ready
to pass through on the first objective line: the
RCR right forward; PPCLI centre; and 42nd
Battalion left forward. The 49th Battalion would

provide mopping-up and carrying parties for the
assault battalions. 48
As a whole, the attack of the Corps was to
be carried out in four stages, each dictated by
the German zones of defence. On 3rd Division's
frontage, the operation would only entail
23
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participation in the first two stages: an advance
at 0530 hours, scheduled to reach the first
objective 35 minutes later. After a 40-minute
pause to reorganize, a subsequent advance would
be made at 0645 hours to a line drawn through
La Folie Wood, along the reverse slope of the
Ridge and bending back on the left to conform
with the objectives of 4th Division. The 7th CIB
was allocated 20 minutes for this second phase.
The lst and 2nd Divisions had objectives at a
maximum distance of 4,000 yards from their
jumping off positions while the 4th Division had
the shortest distance of all but was faced with
the prospect of seizing Hill 145, the strongest
natural defensive position on the whole front. 49
It should be noted here that, German
defensive lines and tactics had changed
significantly everywhere, except on the Ridge
allocated as the Canadians' objective. After the
Somme, the German army had gone to a more
"elastic" defence-in-depth by zones, but on the
Ridge their dispositions were a hold-over from
the past, "designed for Falkenhayn's stonewall
tactics, which proved so disastrous on the
Somme," notes Byng's biographer, Jeffery
Williams. "A more elastic system was planned but
work on it had not begun. In the face of increasing
destruction caused by the British and Canadian
guns and frequent alarms caused by infantry
raids, the garrison could do little more than
maintain their existing defences." 50

At 0530 hours on the morning of 9 April 191 7
the rolling barrages opened, and the attacking
waves of the Canadian divisions went forward.
Waves, in the case of 7th CIB, however, is not
quite an accurate description. All of its assault
battalions had to cross a series of large craters
to their front before seizing their first objective
line. It took the 42nd on the left five minutes to
"scramble across the muddy craters as best they
could, then re-form with great steadiness just as
though they were rehearsing over the tapes at
Bruay."51
By 0730 hours, all three assault battalions
were on their final objectives mopping up, but
the morning was just beginning for the brigade's
left forward battalion. The 42nd Royal
Highlanders from Montreal had to re-group in
the shadow of Hill 145, the highest and most
important feature of the Ridge. The defences of

this hill were particularly strong, ringed with
well-wired trenches and a series of deep dugouts on its rear slopes.
The 42nd got to its final objective line
initially unhindered because these German
defences were being heavily shelled. Once the
Canadian artillery lifted, Hill 145's defenders
were too preoccupied in bloodily repulsing 11th
CIB's attempts to seize it. When 11th CIB went
to ground short of its crucial objective however,
its defenders had more time to take stock of
their situation and see that they could enfilade
7th CIB's position with relative ease in La Folie
Wood on their left. The majority of the 42nd
Battalion's casualties sustained at Vimy were
thus incurred by sniper, MG and observed
artillery fire being brought to bear from Hill
145 on their positions in and around their
consolidated position on the final objective. 52
The major problem of command and control
during the battle for Brigadier-General Macdonell
would therefore be one of liaison over divisional
boundaries with a flanking brigade. His
immediate concern was to consolidate his own
defence and to provide what assistance he could
the following day for the capture of the
troublesome hill on his left flank. Two days after
the capture of Hill 145, lOth CIB would
successfully storm The Pimple, by which time,
the enemy accepting the loss of Vi my Ridge as
permanent, had pulled back two miles to their
Third line in the new Hindenburg system running
southeast from Lens across the open plain.
"The great lesson to be learned from these
operations," read one divisional after-action
report, "is this: If the lessons of the war have
been thoroughly mastered; if the artillery
preparations and the support are good: if our
Intelligence is properly appreciated; there is no
position that cannot be wrested from the enemy
by well-disciplined, well-trained and well-led
troops attacking on a sound plan. " 5 ~ After Vimy,
Brigadier-General Macdonell, in his familiar role
as keeper of 'The Fighting Seventh's" esprit de
corps, noted in his congratulatory address to the
troops that the key factor in their success had
been time. "Never before, "he rightly stated, "had
we the chance to work up to an attack in
detail .... Our training was done with
thoroughness and proved of incalculable value. "54
1
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Comprehensive, progressional and realistic
unit and formation collective training was backed
up with an extensive training system featuring
individual, specialist and reinforcement training
behind the lines. The move to the Vimy Front
had been accompanied by the establishment of
the Canadian Corps Training School [CCTS]
under the command of Major A.C. Critchley,
former BM of 7th CIB. The CCTS was divided
into an Officers' Wing and an NCO Wing to provide
instructors for the Divisional Schools. With its
own training establishment in place, the Corps
was well on the way to ensuring its own particular
doctrine was well-disseminated and understood
by all ranks. But as 7th CIB would learn at Avion
in early July, the tactics required to take German
defences at Vimy, based to a large extent on the
old pre-Somme model, were not necessarily
applicable to the elastic defence system of
pillboxes they would encounter at Passchendaele
or the next year in their assaults to break the
Hindenburg Line.
Initially, the Avion Raid was to have been part
of an limited offensive to "inch up" on the city of
Lens. Currie, short of supporting guns in early
June and thus unable to prevent the enemy from
concentrating overwhelming fire on any
trenches he might seize, convinced Haig that
trying to hold captured ground at great cost
would be unproductive at that time.

Orders called for six battalions to attack on
the night of 8/9 June at midnight: three from
the 11th CIB attacking to the north in the La
Coulotte sector (out of contact with 7th CIB), and
three from 7th CIB in the Avion sector with 49th
Battalion left, 42nd Battalion centre and the RCR
right. Each battalion of 7th CIB would go in on a
four-company front, each with three platoons in
successive waves, the fourth platoons of each
company staying to constitute the garrison of the
jumping-off trench. The 7th CIB battalions were
to attack on approximately 1,200 yards of the
German front in the Avion area, penetrate into
enemy lines to a maximum depth of 800 yards,
hold the ground captured for an hour and a half,
then begin a covered withdrawal, completing the
evacuation in a 30 minute timespan. 55
Preparations for the raid, which would take
place at night, were conducted with Vimy-like
thoroughness behind the lines. Rehearsals were
conducted by day and night over taped ground
and troops instructed to memorize the exact
locations of all known enemy MG posts, trench
mortar posts, and dugouts. The composition and
duties of trench raiding parties received
particular attention. 56
In the aftermath of the raid, the newlypromoted Major-General Macdonell, of course,
regarded it as a huge success. "Batty Mac" wrote

Major-General A.C. Macdonell with his staff, 1st Canadian Division HQ.
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to a subordinate officer two days later: "The
Brigade put on a good show the other night
and we are beginning to consider that we are
'Sturm Truppen' for fair. It was a good 'Show,'
well carried out and successful in every
respect. "57 By contrast. the view from the ranks
was considerably different, especially in the
49th Battalion which sustained the highest
casualties going in on the left flank of the raid.
From Sergeant A. Fowlie's perspective, whose
platoon was virtually wiped out, "it was a very
fierce affair and it lacked the luck. We held the
trench and the Germans infiltrated my
company ... .I lost three very good friends of mine
in that raid. I don't think it was a very good
planned affair after all. "58 On withdrawing after
two hours in the enemy's trenches, the three
battalions forsook the cover of the German
trenches to move back across no-man's-land
and were caught in a heavy German counterbombardment. In the words of Lieutenant G.D.
Kinnaird, 49th Battalion, who was severely
wounded, "the moppers-up were mopped up. "59
The 42nd Battalion History deemed the raid
to be "the most thoroughly organized and
brilliantly carried out minor operation in which
the Brigade ever participated as a unit." As a
battalion, the 42nd went in with its flanks secured
by the other two battalions, though it had the
second highest rate of casualties. It went on to
claim, somewhat correctly, that the raid was out
of the ordinary in that "it was carried out on a
very much larger scale than had ever been
attempted" with the added difficulty of having
been conducted at night. However, ex-Corporal
Will Bird of the 42nd Battalion scathingly defused
much of the credibility of this particular
regimental history when he wrote in 1933, "the
latter is a very finely-bound book and only lacks
a slight insertion at the beginning "For Officers
Only."6o

The 7th CIB reported that it had sustained
335 casualties in the raid, 38 of them fatal, but a
quick tally of the battalion counts show the actual
killed total to have been 44 all ranks. 61 Quick to
justify the raid in terms of its value, 7th CIB
claimed an inordinately high body count of 560
enemy killed, an entire battalion's worth. This
figure is not realistic as the Germans only
manned a regimental sector with one battalion
in the first two lines of trenches and many of the
frontline and second line defenders retreated to

their third line during the attack. Many of the
dugouts destroyed by the 7th CIB raiding force
would thus have been empty. The 49th
Regimental historian asks a valid question and
leaves the answer unstated, but obvious: "Did
this operation yield a credit balance? .. .In the 49th
records one account declares that the attack went
in perfect alignment; another, that it was all
confusion .... The menace of the counter-barrage
perhaps had been over-discounted. In the
darkness the man who sits tight with his weapon
is certain to enjoy an advantage over his
adversary who stumbles across open ground to
seek and destroy him. "62
The planning and training for the Avi on Raid
was Batty Mac's last "show" as brigade
commander, the actual raid taking place after he
had left to take up command of 1st Division. At
home in Canada, his promotion to Major-General
had been questioned by Borden who tried to
block it on the instigation of Major-General Sam
Steele, the latter feeling that the command should
go to Sam Hughes' son, Garnet. The new corps
commander adamantly refused to have Hughes
in lieu of Batty Mac. George Perley. the Minister
responsible for Canada's military forces overseas
supported Currie's decision and told the prime
minister bluntly that Hughes was not wanted at
the front. Major-General Steele was sent home
for his indiscretion in circumventing Perley and
going straight to Borden. 6 ~l
The stories of Batty Mac as GOC of the "Old
Red Patch" are told elsewhere. After the war he
served as the Commandant of the Royal Military
College from 1919 to 1925, his first tenure of
office followed by an unprecedented second
including a one year extension. He would also
serve as the Honorary Colonel of four different
regiments: Lord Strathcona's Horse (RC). The
British Columbia Horse, The Stormont, Dundas,
and Glengarry Highlanders, and the Queen's Own
Cameron Highlanders of Canada.
But it was on taking leave of the Fighting
Seventh that the flamboyant and, normally,
garrulous commander found himself, for the first
time in his career, at a loss for words. The
brigade, out of the line after the Avian Raid,
formed in hollow square on a sunny June day to
say goodbye to him and his "unconventional but
always vivid behaviour, his foolhardiness and his
gift of terse exposition. "64 The 42nd regimental
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padre leaves the best account and summary
of "Batty Mac" as brigade commander:
Not many of us will forget that day at Chateau
de Ia Haie when our Brigadier - afterwards
Major-General Sir Archibald Cameron
Macdonell. K.C.B., C.M.G.,D.S.O. - bade us
farewell as he went to assume command of the
First Division. In silence we waited for his
coming, in silence we listened for the words that
somehow would not come. and then as he put
his horse to the gallop and left us, the Brigade
burst into cheers. and there was more love, more
honour in those cheers than words could have
ever told. Thus the 7th Canadian Inf. Brigade
said goodbye to him who had lived with us and
for us. alternately raged upon us and praised
us, and in all things led us through fair and foul
for over eighteen months. It is not sentiment,
but simple fact. to say that he was loved and
honoured- the grey old chieftain of the clans, a
bonny fighter and a born leader. 65
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